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Redistributing toward the Rich: Strategic
Policy Crafting in the Campaign to Repeal
the Sixteenth Amendment, 1938–19581
Isaac William Martin
University of California, San Diego
Beginning in 1938, some American business groups campaigned to
repeal the Sixteenth Amendment and limit the federal taxation of
income and wealth. Although their proposed upward-redistributive
policy would benefit few voters, it won the support of 31 state
legislatures. To explain this outcome, this article offers a theory of
strategic policy crafting by advocacy groups. Such groups may suc-
ceed even in otherwise unfavorable institutional environments if
they craft their proposals to fit the salient policy context. Archival
evidence and event history analysis support this hypothesis. Public
opinion also helps explain legislative support for upward-redistrib-
utive policy.
The Second World War brought a revolution in the taxation of income,
and, like all revolutions, it involved conflict. In order to pay for the
massive military investment necessary to win the war, Congress increased
tax rates, lowered exemptions, and instituted new procedures to collect
income tax from the majority of American workers and businesses for
the first time in history. In response, several business organizations mo-
bilized to repeal the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which
expressly grants Congress the “power to lay and collect taxes on incomes,”
and to substitute a new amendment that would limit federal taxation of
personal income and wealth by imposing a maximum marginal tax rate
of 25%.
1 For helpful comments on earlier versions of this article, the author would like to
thank the AJS reviewers and editorial board, along with Cheris Chan, Anthony S.
Chen, Jeffrey Haydu, Mark Leff, Michael Mann, Ajay K. Mehrotra, William Roy,
James Sparrow, Joseph Thorndike, and audiences at the Social Science History As-
sociation and the UCLA workshop on comparative historical sociology. Direct all
correspondence to Isaac Martin, Department of Sociology, University of California,
9500 Gilman Drive, San Diego, California 92093. E-mail: iwmartin@ucsd.edu
This content downloaded from 137.110.033.135 on September 19, 2019 11:52:11 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
American Journal of Sociology
2
The surprising thing about this campaign is not that it failed to amend
the Constitution but that it nearly succeeded. Before the war was over,
17 state legislatures had asked Congress to call a constitutional convention
for the purpose of repealing the Sixteenth Amendment and instituting the
new tax limit. Fourteen more states followed suit after the war. By 1954,
the proposed tax limit had won the support of the National Association
of Manufacturers, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the American Bar
Association, and, according to one Gallup poll, 68% of the American
public (New York Times 1952, p. 37; Subcommittee of the Committee on
the Judiciary 1954, pp. 133–36, 215).2 The campaign fell just two states
shy of the quorum needed to call a constitutional convention (Congres-
sional Research Service 2004). And it pioneered much of the antitax rhet-
oric that would come to dominate American politics at the dawn of the
21st century.
Why and how did the campaign win the legislative passage of reso-
lutions in favor of the proposed amendment? Scholars of 20th-century
state building in the United States have described an enduring antistatist
strain in American political culture and have pointed out that expansion
of the state’s taxing power during and after World War II triggered a
backlash in business opinion (Lo 1982; Brownlee 1996; Friedberg 2000;
Bank, Stark, and Thorndike 2008). The campaign is clearly consistent
with this strain of American political culture.
The campaign’s legislative successes are nevertheless puzzling for dem-
ocratic theory. Theorists of politics since Aristotle have argued that dem-
ocratically elected politicians are strongly motivated to redistribute re-
sources from the rich minority to the nonrich majority. But the benefits
of the proposed tax limitation were radically skewed in favor of the rich
minority. At the time of the campaign’s broadest appeal, the majority of
the direct financial benefits would have accrued to less than 2% of tax-
payers ( Joint Committee on the Economic Report and Select Committee
on Small Business of the House of Representatives 1952). The costs could
have been made up in any of several ways, but all of them would have
burdened more voters than they benefited—whether by increasing other
taxes or by cutting spending on popular social programs (U.S. Senate and
House of Representatives Joint Economic Committee 1961). In these re-
spects, the proposed amendment was an early forerunner of the radically
inegalitarian tax policies enacted by the U.S. Congress in the 21st century,
particularly the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of
2 Calculated from Gallup poll 489, USAIPO1952-0489, Roper Center for Public Opin-
ion Research. This was a majority for the principle of a 25% tax limitation; but in
another poll, a majority said they opposed writing this limit into the Constitution (see
Gallup poll 1957-0584).
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2001 (EGTRRA). The latter policy has provoked considerable discussion
among political scientists because it presents a theoretical anomaly: “a
highly salient policy that promises very modest benefits and large long-
term risks to the average voter” (Hacker and Pierson 2005a, p. 34). At a
minimum, the passage of such policy appears to pose a serious challenge
to those versions of democratic theory that assume politicians tailor their
decisions to please a well-informed and self-interested voting majority
(see, e.g., Bartels 2005; Graetz and Shapiro 2005; Hacker and Pierson
2005a, 2005b; Prasad 2005; Lupia et al. 2007; Jones and Williams 2008).
The campaign’s successes also appear anomalous in light of theories
that portray American politics as the province of a “power elite.” Power
elite theorists have pointed out that rich Americans can use their wealth
to evade taxes and that they can and do use their political access and
campaign contributions to secure tax breaks (Mills 1956; Domhoff 1998).
Scholars of American tax policy have also shown that such narrow
interest-group strategies are the modal pattern in business lobbying (Claw-
son, Neustadtl, and Weller 1998) and have argued persuasively that there
are institutional reasons why one should expect rich capitalists to pursue
just such narrow interest-group strategies instead of broad, classwide
appeals. The openness and fragmentation of American political institu-
tions provide many opportunities to tinker with the tax code, and the
decentralized American political economy favors industry- and geogra-
phy-specific coalitions. Thus, most scholars of the subject argue that the
richest Americans can generally expect success if they lobby for tax breaks
narrowly targeted to a particular industry, a particular firm, or even, as
in some notorious cases, a particular individual (Witte 1985; Martin 1991;
King 1993; Steinmo 1993). Such particularistic tax breaks have the added
advantage of being easily concealed from publics that might oppose them
(Arnold 1990; Howard 1997; Johnston 2003). By contrast, the proposal
to repeal the Sixteenth Amendment was what I call upward-redistributive
policy: it would redistribute resources categorically toward the upper in-
come strata as such, without favoritism for particular individuals or in-
dustries.
There is considerable scholarly interest in explaining this upward-
redistributive policy, as evidenced by the growing literature on the Bush
tax cuts. But these studies have limited explanatory leverage because they
focus overwhelmingly on a single policy (namely, EGTRRA). The present
study may shed additional light on the theoretical problem by increasing
the number of observations. Although the campaign to repeal the Six-
teenth Amendment failed at the federal level, my research design exploits
the additional leverage to be gained from variation in state-level outcomes,
following recent sociological studies of the Townsend Plan (Amenta 2005b)
and the Equal Rights Amendment (Soule and King 2006).
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I argue that explaining upward-redistributive policy requires attention
to strategic policy design by advocacy groups—what I call policy crafting.
To make the case for this argument, I begin by reviewing sociological
theory concerned with the politics of redistribution. I turn then to a the-
oretical discussion of policy crafting, before exhibiting its uses in this
historical case and demonstrating its consequences in an event history
analysis of state-level policy.
INSTITUTIONAL POLITICS THEORY AND UPWARD
REDISTRIBUTION
Most sociological research on fiscal policy examines the conditions under
which states adopt spending policies that transfer income from rich to
poor. I focus this review on the synthesis proposed by Amenta and his
coauthors (Amenta and Poulsen 1996; Cauthen and Amenta 1996; Amenta
and Halfmann 2000) under the name of institutional politics theory.
Among this theory’s many virtues are that it effectively synthesizes a vast
literature on the determinants of social spending and has a particularly
impressive empirical track record in studies of redistributive policy at the
state level. Institutional politics theory argues that redistributive transfer
programs result from the political mobilization of advocacy groups allied
with low-income people—potentially including social movement organi-
zations, interest groups, “reform-oriented” political parties, sympathetic
experts, and state bureaucrats—but that political institutions affect the
likelihood that these advocates of redistribution will win the passage of
policies they favor.3
The most fundamental institutional condition for redistributive policy
according to this theory is democracy, usually defined to include com-
petitive elections and widespread suffrage (Amenta and Poulsen 1996;
Cauthen and Amenta 1996; Amenta and Halfmann 2000). The more
broadly voting rights are distributed and the more effectively they are
enforced, the more voice lower-income people will have in the electoral
process. The theory assumes that lower-income people will tend to prefer
redistributive policy. Thus, where politicians must compete for the votes
of lower-income people, they may do so by providing collective benefits
3 I categorize the political actors identified by institutional politics theory under the
umbrella label of advocacy groups, following the discussion of “advocacy organizations”
by Andrews and Edwards (2004), in order to emphasize that the theory outlined here
is intended to apply quite generally to “groups and organizations that make public
interest claims either promoting or resisting social change that if implemented, would
conflict with the social, cultural, political or economic interests or values of other
constituencies and groups” (Andrews and Edwards 2004, p. 485).
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in the form of redistributive social policy. Studies of the formative years
of social provision in the United States (Amenta and Poulsen 1996;
Cauthen and Amenta 1996; Amenta 1998; Amenta and Halfmann 2000)
and in western Europe (Lindert 2004) support the hypothesis that greater
democracy is associated with more redistributive spending.
A second institutional factor identified by institutional politics theory
is party organization. The theory distinguishes between programmatic
party systems, in which parties define themselves by adherence to shared
ideology, and patronage party systems, in which parties define themselves
by personal ties of loyalty and dependence. Parties of the former type are
more likely to distribute collective benefits; parties of the latter type com-
pete by distributing particularistic favors and will tend to oppose redis-
tributive social policies that deprive political elites of personal discretion
over public monies (Erie 1988; Shefter 1994). Empirical studies of U.S.
states support the view that patronage-oriented or “traditional” party or-
ganization is associated with less redistributive social policy (Mayhew
1986; Amenta and Poulsen 1996; Cauthen and Amenta 1996; Lieberman
1998; Amenta and Halfmann 2000). Conversely, Amenta and his coauthors
argue that redistributive social spending policies are most likely where
government is controlled by a programmatic political party allied with
the interests of low-income voters—a “reform-oriented regime” (Amenta
1998; Amenta and Halfmann 2000).
Institutional politics theory addresses policies that redistribute in favor
of the poor. How would this theory approach the passage of policies that
redistribute in favor of the rich? In keeping with the logic of the theory,
one might hypothesize that upward-redistributive policies are most likely
to pass where democracy is limited and where the reins of government
are in the hands of a programmatic governing party that is openly allied
with the interests of the wealthy—a riches-oriented regime.
I argue that this logic correctly identifies favorable conditions for up-
ward-redistributive policy but that advocates of upward-redistributive
policy ordinarily must frame their policy demands to succeed under less
favorable conditions. Openly riches-oriented regimes are rare because the
rich are a small constituency that is unusually expensive to please. Up-
ward-redistributive policy is therefore likely to offend widely held norms
of fairness. It is also likely to conflict with other popular budget priorities.
And because the rich are few, upward-redistributive policy is likely to
please fewer constituents than it offends. For these reasons, even those
elected officials who are sympathetic and who face only a partially de-
mocratized polity are typically reluctant to espouse upward redistribution
in public.
In short, precisely because democracy and programmatic party systems
are constraints on upward redistribution, explanations for upward-redis-
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tributive policy must also attend to the strategies that advocates use to
circumvent these constraints.
CRAFTING POLICY TO FIT THE CONTEXT
An important strategy for advocacy groups that are pursuing upward-
redistributive policy is policy crafting—designing their own policy pro-
posals “to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner by-
stander support, and to demobilize antagonists” (Snow and Benford 1988,
p. 198). Social movement scholars have studied how social movement
organizations attract support by constructing a culturally resonant “col-
lective action frame,” a definition of the situation that diagnoses a social
ill and implies a particular solution (Snow and Benford 1988; McAdam,
McCarthy, and Zald 1996; Benford 1997; Benford and Snow 2000). Stud-
ies of framing also occupy an increasingly important place in scholarship
on public policy and on public finance in particular (Entman 1993;
McCaffery 1994; Jacoby 2000; McCaffery and Baron 2004, 2005, 2006;
Fang and Silverman 2006; Frey and Stutzer 2006; Loewenstein, Small,
and Strnad 2006; Steensland 2008). This research has demonstrated that
agenda setters can manipulate public preferences over public policies by
“crafted talk” ( Jacobs and Shapiro 2000, p. 27; Graetz and Shapiro 2005)
that shapes the perception of policy trade-offs. Most of the scholarship
on framing and public policy, however, addresses the strategic use of
crafted talk to sell a policy proposal after it has been written and neglects
the framing work that goes into the drafting of the policy itself. I use the
term “policy crafting” specifically to designate the latter: the encoding of
a collective action frame in the text of a policy proposal.
Strategic policy crafting is possible because there are many ways to
write a policy that will achieve a given end. The same distribution of
costs and benefits, for example, can be achieved by any of several different
policy instruments, from regulation to taxation to spending, and each of
these instruments in turn involves several parameters that can be ma-
nipulated independently (on social policy, see, e.g., Howard [2006]). Policy
makers and other policy-oriented actors—including interest groups and
social movement organizations—therefore have considerable freedom to
craft policy proposals in ways that they believe will be politically advan-
tageous, without sacrificing their goals.
Strategic policy crafting works because policy makers and the public
possess bounded rationality (Simon 1955) and limited information pro-
cessing capacity. Given the overwhelming variety of options facing policy
makers and the limited time available to them, policy makers who wish
to accomplish a particular goal or reward a particular constituency face
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two difficult cognitive problems. First, they must narrow the potentially
overwhelming list of policy alternatives to a feasible choice set. Second,
they must choose among those alternatives on the basis of limited infor-
mation about their consequences (Lindblom 1959; Lindblom and Wood-
house [1968] 1993; Kingdon 1995; Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Zahar-
iadis 2007). Decision makers confronted with these tasks typically rely on
“fast and frugal” heuristics that narrow the decision to a small set of
salient policy options, including those that are available for imitation in
their local social context (Gigerenzer and Todd 1999).
I expect advocacy groups to succeed where they craft their policy pro-
posals to capitalize on policy makers’ heuristic decision-making strategies.
This argument builds on several recent social movement studies that argue
that policy-oriented social movement organizations can expect the most
success when they tailor their lobbying tactics to their institutional en-
vironment (Amenta, Halfmann, and Young 1999a; Wilde 2004; Amenta
2005a, 2005b). I add that the tactical decisions may go beyond the choice
of lobbying tactics to include the drafting of the policy text itself. This
argument also draws on several recent studies that argue that advocacy
groups succeed by tailoring their proposals to the discursive opportunity
structure (Ferree 2003), the cultural assumptions of their milieu (Steens-
land 2006), or the perceptions of policy elites (Skrentny 2006). Much of
this research, however, characterizes the relevant cultural context as a set
of inarticulate, taken-for-granted, or “background” assumptions. I con-
ceptualize the proximate cultural context instead as a limited set of other
policies and policy proposals that are salient, or readily available to the
foreground of policy makers’ attention.4 I refer to this set as the policy
context. Advocacy groups win by crafting policy proposals to fit the policy
context.
Policy Crafting and the Policy Process
How does an advocacy group best craft a policy proposal to fit the policy
context? Some hypotheses can be inferred from a general theory of the
policy process. I follow recent work on social movements and public policy
in conceptualizing the policy process as a multistage “funnel” (Soule and
King 2006; see also Jones and Baumgartner 2005). At each stage, policy
4 The policy context may be structured by deep cultural assumptions of long standing
(Steensland 2006, 2007), but such deep symbolic structure is unlikely to provide much
explanatory leverage on the empirical problem considered in this article because there
is little reason to expect that the deep structure of American culture varied from state
to state in the mid-20th century. I nevertheless test state-level measures of deeply held
cultural attitudes such as individualism and antistatism in regression analyses reported
in the appendix.
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makers must decide among fewer alternatives, and at each stage the choice
carries greater consequences (Burstein and Linton 2002; King, Cornwall,
and Dahlin 2005; Soule and King 2006).
At the earliest stages, the problem for policy makers is to set the agenda
by narrowing the potentially infinite universe of possible proposals to a
definite set of alternatives (Kingdon 1995; Jones and Baumgartner 2005).5
The stakes in this decision are low, since the decision to place a proposal
on the legislative agenda implies no commitment to enact the policy and
has few immediate consequences (Soule and King 2006). Policy makers
at this stage often cope by adopting a heuristic based on imitation (cf.
Gigerenzer and Todd 1999): they borrow a familiar policy that has been
applied to a different target group (Skrentny 2006) or that exists in another
jurisdiction (Karch 2007). Advocacy groups can play to this coping strat-
egy by crafting their policy proposals to appear familiar to policy makers—
a tactic that, following recent literature, I call policy imitation (Karch
2007; Shipan and Volden 2008). Advocacy groups may imitate a policy
that has been applied to another domain or target population in the same
jurisdiction. Alternatively, they may imitate a policy from another juris-
diction (Clemens 1997; Rodgers 1998; Martin 2001; Grattet 2005).
At the final stages of the policy process, the problem facing policy
makers is how to choose a policy among a small set of alternatives (King-
don 1995; Jones and Baumgartner 2005). Because the stakes in this de-
cision are high, policy makers devote more time and cognitive effort to
discerning the consequences of the alternatives. They are typically con-
cerned with both substantive consequences (e.g., how well a policy will
solve the problem it is purported to solve) and political consequences (e.g.,
how a policy will affect their own reelection chances); indeed, the two
sets of considerations are ordinarily blended, since the political impact of
a policy may hinge on how voters perceive its economic, social, or fiscal
impact (Karch 2007). The most advantageous strategy for advocacy
groups at this stage is to craft their policy proposals in ways that make
the benefits salient to policy makers and obscure the costs (Arnold 1990;
Pierson 1994; Hacker and Pierson 2005b). Following Pierson (1994), I call
this tactic obfuscation. The intended target of policy obfuscation may be
5 It is common for policy scholars to recognize stages of the policy process, although
different accounts distinguish different numbers of stages in accord with scholars’
differing analytic purposes. Kingdon (1995) distinguishes two early stages prior to the
decision to enact a policy into law (agenda setting and defining policy alternatives);
Jones and Baumgartner (2005) distinguish three (problem recognition, problem char-
acterization, and defining alternatives). I follow Soule and King (2006) in distinguishing
simply between early and late stages. The important point, for the purposes of this
article, is that policy makers must define a limited set of alternatives prior to making
a binding choice among those alternatives.
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legislators or voters or both. Policy obfuscation may be an effective way
for an advocacy group to win legislative support even if legislators are
undeceived: if an advocacy group wishes to win legislative support, it
may be sufficient to craft a policy proposal in a way that persuades
legislators that voters will not perceive substantial budgetary trade-offs.
Note, too, that although obfuscation always involves an attempt to di-
minish the perceived costs of a policy, it need not entail insincerity: mem-
bers of an advocacy group may be motivated to minimize the perceived
costs of a policy because they genuinely believe the true costs to be min-
imal.
In the case of upward-redistributive policy, successful obfuscation re-
quires writing a policy to obscure the budgetary and political trade-offs
involved in expensive transfers to the rich. There are many ways to ma-
nipulate the perception of fiscal policy trade-offs (see, e.g., McCaffery
1994; McCaffery and Baron 2004, 2005, 2006), but a key expedient in
policy crafting is manipulating the timing of costs in order to reduce their
salience and perceived magnitude (see Arnold 1990). Hacker and Pierson
(2005b) list several policy devices that may be used for this purpose. A
“sunset clause” that imposes an expiration date, for example, may be used
cynically to reduce estimates of the lifetime cost of a policy, in the ex-
pectation that the policy will not actually be permitted to expire. This
device and others like it manipulate the timing or perceived likelihood of
costs in order to make a policy proposal appear less risky.
In order to illustrate the effects of policy crafting, I turn now to the
history of the campaign to repeal the Sixteenth Amendment. Because this
campaign is little known or remembered—it is mentioned in only a few
specialized monographs, where it receives only passing mention (Leff
1984; Witte 1985; Howard 1997)—I draw on archival sources to present
a brief narrative overview, before turning to a state-level analysis of policy
outcomes.
THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CAMPAIGN TO LIMIT
PROGRESSIVE TAXES
The rise and fall of the campaign to repeal the Sixteenth Amendment
followed the rhythms of war and state building. The mobilization peaked
in early 1943, during some of the heaviest fighting of World War II and
just after the Revenue Act of 1942 mandated the largest expansion of the
tax in American history in order to pay for the war. The mobilization for
income tax limitation peaked again in 1951, shortly after the Korean War,
the Revenue Act of 1950, and the Excess Profits Tax Act of 1950, which
introduced large tax increases and reversed the post–World War II trend
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toward income tax cuts (Ratner (1967) 1980). Figure 1 plots the number
of states passing resolutions in each year alongside the annual change in
income tax revenues as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP);
the two time series correlate closely for the period 1939–58 ( ).6rp .75
Two organizations led the campaign. The first was the American Tax-
payers Association, formerly the American Taxpayers’ League, an organ-
ization founded in 1924 to lobby for income tax cuts on behalf of the
rural banking industry (see Chicago Daily Tribune 1939, p. 22; Murnane
2004). By the mid-1930s, the American Taxpayers Association was a gen-
eral business association that had close ties to the National Association
of Manufacturers, the retail industry, and other business associations (New
York Times 1941, p. 12, 1942a, p. 1, 1942b, p. 34, 1956, p. 27; Subcommittee
No. 3 of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives
1958, p. 9). The second organization was the Committee for Constitutional
Government. This was a committee of prominent businesspeople that the
conservative Republican newspaper publisher Frank Gannett convened
in 1937 to oppose President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s court-packing plan.
After the court-packing bill died in Congress, the committee moved on
to a variety of other anti–New Deal causes, including upward redistri-
bution via the income tax (Polenberg 1965; George 1993, pp. 168–69).
Both organizations could justly claim credit for writing the amendment.
The author, a Rhode Island lawyer and industrialist named Robert B.
Dresser, served on the executive committee of the American Taxpayers
Association and on the advisory board of the committee.7 He drafted the
constitutional amendment to limit federal tax rates in 1938. The proposed
amendment would repeal the Sixteenth Amendment and then restore it,
word for word, with the added proviso that “in no case shall the maximum
rate of tax exceed 25 percent.” The new amendment would also apply
the 25% cap to “any tax, duty, or excise which Congress may lay and
collect with respect to the devolution or transfer of property, or any interest
therein, upon or in contemplation of death, or by way of gift.”8 Repre-
6 Federal income taxes as a percentage of GDP calculated from the National Income
and Product Accounts, tables 1.1.5 and 3.4, accessed via the “interactive tables” feature
of the National Economic Accounts, Bureau of Economic Analysis Web site, http://
www.bea.gov/bea/dn1.htm, accessed October 14, 2006.
7 Committee for Constitutional Government, “A Ceiling on the Power to Destroy You
By Taxation,” n.d., ca. 1944, ephemera, University of Iowa Right Wing Collection,
microfilm, reel 36 (hereafter CCG).
8 Congressional Record 84 (1939): 2509–10. On Dresser’s authorship, see “Address of
Mr. Robert B. Dresser,” Houston, May 14, 1953, CCG. It was generally agreed that
the limit applied to the top marginal rate of income tax, but there was some ambiguity
about its interpretation. The text of the proposed amendment was revised several
times, and several versions circulated simultaneously over the course of the campaign.
Some of these versions called for a “maximum aggregate rate of tax” of 25% (emphasis
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sentative Emanuel Celler (D-N.Y.) proposed the amendment to Congress
on June 15, 1938, at the request of the American Taxpayers Association.
The proposed amendment died in the House Judiciary Committee (Collins
1951, p. 37).
The American Taxpayers Association and the Committee for Consti-
tutional Government then launched a campaign in the states. Their strat-
egy was to exploit Article V of the Constitution, which compels the Con-
gress to call a constitutional convention by application of two-thirds of
the states. It was a long shot. No one had ever achieved the two-thirds
quorum. Even if the American Taxpayers Association and the committee
achieved it, they would have two more equally daunting hurdles to clear,
including a vote at the constitutional convention itself and then the rat-
ification of the amendment by three-fourths of the states. Moreover, be-
cause this method of amending the Constitution was untested, it presented
thorny questions of constitutional interpretation, and even the best-case
scenario promised to lead the campaign into a lengthy court battle. Dresser
and his allies began to arm themselves with legal arguments. But they
were gambling that the growing pressure would force Congress to take
action on the amendment before the campaign ever crossed the two-thirds
threshold (Nelson 1943, p. S7; Subcommittee of the Committee on the
Judiciary 1954).
In keeping with my theoretical expectations, these advocates of upward
redistribution recognized democracy as an obstacle to realizing their am-
bitions—and they worked creatively to circumvent that obstacle. The
decision to turn to the states was a decision to pursue the campaign in a
legislative venue where public awareness of and participation in policy
debates was limited. Activists launched the campaign in states far outside
national media markets. An American Taxpayers Association organizer
named J. A. Arnold moved to Chicago and founded a front group called
the Western Tax Council to lobby for the amendment in legislatures west
of the Mississippi (Ready 1966, p. 137). No printed campaign literature
survives from the earliest years of the campaign, and probably none ex-
isted. The backers of the amendment lobbied state legislators in private.9
added), which might be taken to imply a limit on the average tax rate rather than the
marginal tax rate (U.S. Senate and House of Representatives Joint Economic Com-
mittee 1961, p. 7).
9 Congressman Wright Patman (D-Tex.), who followed the progress of this movement
obsessively, charged that the proponents preferred to introduce their resolutions and
pass them without discussion at the end of the legislative session, when there was little
chance of their being noticed by the public. In most cases where the resolution passed,
he said, “It just kind of went through, just by agreement at the end of the session”
(Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary 1954, p. 47). The legislative record
appears to support his charge. Of the first 24 state resolutions in support of the amend-
ment, at least 19 were passed between March and June—i.e., at or near the end of
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The American Taxpayers Association newsletter, which appears to have
been written for circulation to close allies, was even edited to keep the
identity and movements of the campaign’s field organizer a secret.10 The
issue was rarely debated openly in legislative session (Subcommittee of
the Committee on the Judiciary 1954, p. 47), and most of the available
qualitative evidence about the content of state-level debates comes from
nationally circulating material that was directed explicitly at state-level
decision makers.
Policy Imitation: Constitutional Tax Limitation
The first critical policy-crafting decision that the activists made was to
design their policy as a constitutional tax limitation. This was not the
only way to achieve a lasting tax reduction for the rich. Previous cam-
paigns for upward redistribution had sought variously to amend the Con-
stitution to abolish the income tax outright or to limit the growth of top
income tax rates without amending the Constitution at all. Even the idea
of imposing a maximum tax rate of 25% did not necessarily require con-
stitutional limitation. Dresser got the idea of a maximum marginal tax
rate from the speeches of Calvin Coolidge, who had described the 25%
limit as a law of economics rather than as a constitutional rule.11 The
American Taxpayers’ League had lobbied Congress for a 25% tax cap
during the Coolidge administration, but they had framed their policy
demand as a statutory maximum, not a constitutional amendment (Mur-
nane 2004). The device of constitutional limitation was a novel tactical
decision.
By crafting the policy as a constitutional tax limitation, Dresser and
his allies were yoking their demands to a policy instrument that was
familiar to state legislators. Several states had constitutional limits on the
rate of property tax that dated from the Progressive Era, and popular
protest over the cost of relief had led states to adopt new constitutional
limits on state and local taxation during the Depression (Leff 1984; Beito
1989). In the decade before Dresser drafted his amendment, seven states
the states’ brief legislative calendars (Toll 1938; Joint Committee on the Economic
Report and Select Committee on Small Business of the House of Representatives 1952).
10 American Taxpayers Association, “Two More States Approve Program to Limit Fed-
eral Taxing Power,” Tax Information Series, no. 50 (March 30, 1944), University of
Iowa Right-Wing Collection, microfilm, reel 8 (hereafter ATA). It is likely that J. A.
Arnold was the organizer in question and that his name was withheld because his
controversial lobbying activities on behalf of the Southern Tariff Association in the
1920s had made his name “a symbol for injurious lobbying” (Ready 1966, p. 137).
11 Robert B. Dresser, “Reply to Objections of Tax Research Division of U.S. Treasury,”
n.d., ca. 1944, p. 2, CCG; Hartford Courant, “A Ceiling on Taxes,” n.d., ca. 1944, CCG.
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had enacted some form of property tax rate limitation, and four had
explicitly amended their constitutions to limit income tax rates (New York
State Tax Commission and Commerce Clearing House 1940–52; U.S. Ad-
visory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 1995). Many more
states had discussed such limitations. At the time Dresser began his cam-
paign, state legislators were familiar with constitutional tax limits.
Dresser and his allies imitated this approach in order to persuade leg-
islators that the proposed federal tax limitation was safe to put on the
agenda. Dresser likened the proposed amendment to state-level precedents
in one of his first public appeals on behalf of the campaign, in 1944. In
response to the argument that it was a bad idea to write a maximum tax
rate into the constitution, he pointed out that it was already done in the
states: “It is worthy of note that the constitutions of 19 states contain
curbs on the taxing power of their legislatures, and that in four of these
states—Florida, Louisiana, North Carolina and Utah—the curb relates
to taxes on income.”12 An American Taxpayers Association leaflet of 1944
apparently directed at state legislators and influential businessmen echoed
his point: “Practically every state has a constitutional limitation on its
taxing power. So should the federal government.” Of the Dresser amend-
ment proposal, the leaflet said, “It is no different in its effect than the
limitation now found in many states upon the power to tax.”13 Samuel
B. Pettengill, a former Congressman and trustee of the Committee for
Constitutional Government, thought the analogy obvious: “Many state
and local governments have constitutional limitations on their power to
tax or incur debt. The federal government has none.”14 The point was
echoed by a national committee of state legislators who supported the
resolution. The State Legislators for the XXII Amendment urged their
colleagues around the country to apply the familiar policy of constitutional
tax limitation to federal government: “If it is sound to limit the taxing
power of State and local government, it is doubly sound to limit with
respect to income, gift, and inheritance taxes, that power in the hands of
the Federal Government.”15 All of these proponents argued that the pro-
12 Dresser, “Reply to Objections of Tax Research Division,” p. 6. Legislatures in three
of these four states would later embrace the cause of federal tax limitation.
13 American Taxpayers Association, Why the 25 Percent Limit on Federal Taxes, n.d.,
ca. 1944, pp. 12, 16, folder “Booklets and Leaflets on the Tax Limitation Amendment,”
box 108A, Wright Patman Personal Papers, Lyndon Baines Johnson Memorial Library,
Austin, Texas (hereafter WP).
14 Samuel B. Pettengill, “The Grand Strategy of Freedom,” address delivered in Chi-
cago, October 12, 1949, CCG.
15 State Legislators for the XXII Amendment, “An Argument for the XXII Amend-
ment,” n.d., ca. 1945, CCG.
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posed federal tax limitation amendment was analogous to state limitations
on state and local taxation.
In short, Dresser and his allies made use of the fact that constitutional
tax limitation was salient to state legislators. Moreover, the way that they
drew the analogy to prior policies suggests a tactic of policy imitation,
rather than the more deliberative process of “policy learning” that is de-
scribed in some other accounts of policy feedback (cf. Pierson 1993, 1994).
Policy learning is a process of cognitive feedback that “involves a deter-
mination of whether a policy adopted elsewhere has been successful”
(Shipan and Volden 2008, p. 841). Dresser and the other advocates of
constitutional tax limitation did not introduce any data or even make any
unsubstantiated claims about the effectiveness of state-level tax limita-
tions. They merely reminded state legislators that such precedents existed
and thereby reminded legislators that constitutional tax limitation was
already within their ken. By designing their proposal as a constitutional
limitation—rather than a statutory limitation on tax increases or an out-
right abolishment of the tax—Dresser and his allies crafted their policy
tactically to resemble a model that was familiar to state legislators.
Obfuscation: The Emergency Clause
In 1944, the movement entered a new stage. A wave of states passed
resolutions in 1943, and suddenly the campaign was news. In October
1943, the campaign received sympathetic coverage in the New York Times
(Nelson 1943, p. S7). On February 25, 1944, New Jersey became the
sixteenth state to pass the resolution—marking the halfway point toward
the constitutional threshold for calling a convention. In March 1944, the
magazine Modern Industry ran a story about the campaign, and a sub-
sequent reader poll found 82% of subscribers favoring a limit on the tax
rate.16 The treasury secretary, Henry Morgenthau, Jr., directed his Division
of Tax Research to study the effects of the proposed amendment. The
report, issued in the summer of 1944, argued that the amendment would
eliminate the possibility of a budget surplus, shift the tax burden onto
low-income taxpayers, and impair the government’s ability to respond to
emergencies such as the war.17 In November, the Congressional Digest
ran a special issue devoted to the question of whether the federal taxing
power should be limited (Congressional Digest 1944).
16 American Taxpayers Association, “Recent Tax Happenings,” Tax Information Series,
no. 56 (June 12, 1944), ATA.
17 U.S. Treasury Department, Division of Tax Research, “Proposed Constitutional
Amendment to Prohibit Federal Tax Rates Exceeding 25 Percent,” May 31, 1944, folder
T, box 108D, WP. See Dresser, “Reply to Objections of Tax Research Division,” p. 2.
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As the amendment began to seem attainable, advocates faced a new
problem: their difficulty was no longer persuading state legislators to put
federal tax limitation on the agenda but persuading them to vote for the
amendment despite the difficult fiscal and political trade-offs that it would
entail. Opponents of the amendment highlighted the fiscal trade-off be-
tween tax limitation and national defense. Progressives decried the Com-
mittee for Constitutional Government as unpatriotic. The Revenue Act
of 1942 had been justified explicitly as a war act (Paul 1954; Ratner [1967]
1980; Bank et al. 2008), and the Treasury Department funded promotional
films, public rallies, and print advertisements that urged people to pay
taxes by presenting taxes as a patriotic purchase of military equipment
for American “boys” overseas ( Jones 1996; Bank et al. 2008; Sparrow
2008). By proposing to limit taxes, the argument went, the committee
risked undermining the military during a defense emergency. Congress-
man Wright Patman (D-Tex.), a veteran of the First World War and a
champion of veterans’ benefits, was particularly vociferous in challenging
the consequences of the policy. In speeches on the radio and on the House
floor, Patman characterized the committee as “the most sinister lobby in
America” and described Gannett and other leaders of the committee as
“fascists.” “We must wake up and put an end to this unholy crusade which
has already prevailed upon two-thirds of all of the State legislatures it
has yet invaded to do its will,” Patman said in June 1944. “It is not yet
too late, but next year it may be too late” (Patman 1944, p. 269).18 He
had copies of this speech distributed to every state legislator in the country,
and the following year the campaign nearly ground to a standstill (Sub-
committee of the Committee on the Judiciary 1954, p. 46).
Contemporaries saw the year 1944 as a turning point for the movement.
The Committee for Constitutional Government distributed a circular let-
ter acknowledging that the movement to date had been “almost unnoticed
nationally” but announcing that the time had come for an “intensive
campaign of education” to arouse public opinion.19 The American Tax-
payers Association agreed that a turning point had been reached but
argued that the committee’s publicity was partly to blame: “It has served
notice upon the ‘opposition’ that the program was under way and from
now on it is definitely going to be much more difficult to secure favorable
action on these resolutions than it would have been if the program had
18 Patman did more than speechify: he also opened hearings to investigate the finances
of the committee, and a congressional committee subpoenaed the names of the com-
mittee’s contributors. The committee’s chief executive, a newspaper publisher named
Edward Aloysius Rumely, refused to release the names and was cited for contempt of
Congress (George 1993, pp. 167–68).
19 Committee for Constitutional Government, “A Ceiling on the Power to Destroy You
by Taxation.”
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been carried on as in the past in a quiet and effective way.”20 Observers
outside these organizations also agreed that the new atmosphere of pub-
licity put state legislators in a hard position. “Until quite recently the
proposal appears to have had fairly clear sailing,” wrote a member of a
conservative business association called the Citizens’ National Committee
in 1944:
The campaign for it has been quietly conducted, and has been of such a
nature that relatively little opposition has been aroused in state legislatures
where it has been up for action.
Within the past year, however, it has attracted more attention. The
opposition has begun to organize. As already noted the petition has failed
of passage in some state legislatures, and from now on the prospects prob-
ably are for more concerted opposition.21
State legislators now had to worry about appearing fiscally irresponsible
and even unpatriotic if they voted to limit the federal income tax. A
committee of the Council of State Governments considered the proposed
tax limitation amendment and recommended against it on the grounds
that it would pose “a threat to the national credit” (Congressional Digest
1944, p. 259). The editor of the Congressional Digest noted that state
legislators’ opposition was rooted in the fear that the tax limitation “would
be robbing the American tax system of a flexibility needed for unexpected
economic emergencies, particularly in the event of war” (1944, p. 259).
The American Taxpayers Association and the Committee for Consti-
tutional Government crafted new policy language to counter this oppo-
sition. They were particularly concerned to obfuscate the potential impact
of tax limitation on the defense budget. Their solution was to rewrite the
tax limit amendment to add an emergency clause that would permit a
supermajority of three-fourths of each house of Congress to override the
tax limit in wartime: “In the event of a war in which the United States
is engaged creating a grave national emergency requiring such action to
avoid national disaster, the Congress by a vote of three-fourths of each
House may for a period not exceeding 1 year increase beyond the limits
above prescribed the maximum rate of any such tax upon income sub-
sequently accruing or received or with respect to subsequent devolutions
or transfers of property” ( Joint Committee on the Economic Report and
Select Committee on Small Business of the House of Representatives 1952,
20 American Taxpayers Association, “Recent Action of State Legislatures in Connection
with Repeal of 16th Amendment,” Tax Information Series, no. 48 (March 10, 1944),
ATA.
21 Citizens’ National Committee, A Proposed Amendment to the Constitution: 25% Tax
Rate Limitation, Its Pros and Cons, Report no. 2-403 (Washington, D.C., 1944), p. 15,
folder “File on American Taxpayers Association,” box 108B, WP.
This content downloaded from 137.110.033.135 on September 19, 2019 11:52:11 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
American Journal of Sociology
18
p. 103). Opponents charged that this emergency clause was so hedged
about with qualifications, and that the three-fourths threshold was so
prohibitive, as to render the clause moot.22 These critics correctly under-
stood the emergency clause as a tactical addition to the proposed amend-
ment. Dresser acknowledged as much by continuing to insist that the
emergency clause would never need to be invoked—there was no need
to increase taxes above the limitation even in wartime, because cutting
income tax rates, he said, would actually encourage economic growth
enough to increase tax revenues and thereby help the war effort.23 The
emergency clause was merely intended to reassure skeptical legislators
that the tax limit would not entail a budgetary trade-off with national
defense.
This strategy of obfuscation seemed to work. The campaign began to
make new headway, despite the onset of the Korean War, which might
have made the trade-off between tax cuts and defense spending even
more salient. In 1951, Congressmen Chauncey Reed (R-Ill.) and Senator
Everett Dirksen (R-Ill.) introduced a version of the new amendment in
the House and the Senate. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce endorsed the
tax limit. So did the American Legion, the National Association of Man-
ufacturers, the National Small Business Men’s Association, and the Amer-
ican Bar Association (New York Times 1952, p. 37; Subcommittee of the
Committee on the Judiciary 1954, pp. 133–36, 215). The pace of state
resolutions picked up dramatically in the 1951 legislative session, and—
as illustrated in table 1—the new states embraced the version with the
emergency clause. The matter was sufficiently pressing that the new trea-
sury secretary, John W. Snyder, once again detailed Treasury staff to issue
a critical report (Morris 1952, p. 18). The Republican presidential can-
didate Dwight David Eisenhower even weighed in on the issue with a
letter to the Daily Advertiser in Lafayette, Louisiana, dated October 6,
1952, in which he asserted that “a prudent and positive administration
should be able to approach the goal which the amendment seeks without
the difficulty and dangers involved in the adoption or continuing operation
22 See, e.g., Wright Patman to D. J. Driscoll, March 7, 1945, folder D; and Wright
Patman to Olin Linn, March 16, 1945, folder A, both in box 108C, WP.
23 Dresser, “Reply to Objections of Tax Research Division,” p. 2. The Committee for
Constitutional Government issued a fund-raising letter, with the signature of Norman
Vincent Peale, soliciting funds for a mass mailing to “have the country seeded” with
1 million copies of this argument. Committee for Constitutional Government, “A Ceil-
ing on the Power to Destroy You By Taxation.” See also “Address of Mr. Robert B.
Dresser,” Houston, May 14, 1953; Robert B. Dresser, “An Explanation of the Proposals
to Limit by Constitutional Amendment the Taxing Power of Congress,” in It’s Still
Your Fight, n.d., ca. 1953, CCG.
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TABLE 1
States Passing Resolutions in Favor of a 25% Tax Limit Amendment
to the Federal Constitution, by Year and by Presence
or Absence of Emergency Clause
Year
No Emergency
Clause
With Emergency
Clause
1938 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1939 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Wyo.
1940 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Miss. R.I.
1941 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Iowa Mass., Maine, Mich.
1942 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ark., Ind., N.H., Pa. Ala., Del., Ill., Wis.
1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ky., N.J.
1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1946 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1947 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1948 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1949 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Neb.
1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . La.
1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Maine, Iowa, Kans., Mont.,
N.Mex., Nev., Utah, Fla.
1952 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mass., Ga.
1953 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . N.H.
1954 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1955 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Okla.
1956 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . S.C.
1957 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ind., Tenn., Ark.
of such an amendment to our Constitution” (Subcommittee of the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary 1954, p. 51).
The Campaign Fades
With the retrenchment of the income tax after the Korean War, the grass-
roots campaign for a constitutional tax limit gradually faded away. The
waning enthusiasm of the campaigners may have reflected new divisions
on the right. Some conservatives who were increasingly concerned about
inflation had come to see the income tax as a useful tool of economic
management. Reed and Dirksen catered to them by crafting yet another
new proposal in January 1953 that further expanded the emergency clause.
Their version would permit a three-fourths majority of Congress to raise
tax rates above the 25% limit on a temporary one-year basis even in
peacetime, provided that the tax rate on the highest incomes did not exceed
the bottom tax rate by more than 15 percentage points. The new version,
the Committee for Constitutional Government argued, “does not impair
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the government’s ability to raise any amount of revenue desired,” but the
new language appeared to be another bit of tactical policy crafting de-
signed to make high tax rates on the rich politically impossible by forcing
Congress to apply similarly high rates to all voters.24
This policy crafting may have attracted some moderate supporters, but
it also repelled militants on the right who thought that it missed the whole
point of repealing the Sixteenth Amendment. Several rich activists, in-
cluding a founding member of the Committee for Constitutional Gov-
ernment named Charles Coburn, founded the Organization to Repeal
Federal Income Taxes in order to push for a new amendment that would
do away with federal income taxes altogether. (“You cannot get rid of a
weed by cutting it off at just grass level,” one of them explained to a
reporter [Hill 1957, p. 57].)
The campaign’s gradual disappearance may also have reflected a failure
of will. As the activists came closer to the threshold for calling a consti-
tutional convention, some of them began to get cold feet. “There isn’t a
soul that I know that wants a convention,” Dresser said in 1953, “for the
simple reason that there is probably no way of limiting the agenda of
such a convention. It might rewrite the entire Constitution of the United
States of America.” He called on Congress “to propose the amendment
itself so as to avoid the dangers of a Constitutional Convention.”25 He
campaigned for the new Reed-Dirksen amendment and began to argue
that state resolutions in favor of different versions of his tax limitation
amendment should not count toward the same quorum for the purpose
of calling a constitutional convention (Subcommittee of the Committee
on the Judiciary 1954).26 By 1958, the Committee for Constitutional Gov-
ernment was circulating a manifesto that no longer made any specific
reference to constitutional tax limitation but simply stated that “the heavy
progressive rate features of our income tax laws can and must be elim-
inated.”27
No other states passed resolutions in favor of the amendment after
1957. The campaign stopped two states shy of the quorum necessary to
call a convention (see Congressional Research Service 2004).
24 The only way to retain the then-current top income marginal tax rate of 91%, for
example, would have been to force even the poorest income tax payer to contribute
76% of his or her taxable income. See Committee for Constitutional Government,
“Program for Action during Critical Year Ahead—June 1955 to June 1956,” RG 56,
entry 193, box 34, binder “Committee for Constitutional Government, 1955–56,” CCG.
25 “Address of Mr. Robert B. Dresser,” p. 5.
26 See also “A Statement by Robert B. Dresser,” in It’s Still Your Fight, CCG.
27 Committee for Constitutional Government, “Platform for Patriotic Americans,” Au-
gust 18, 1958, CCG.
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HOW THEY ALMOST WON
Does tactical policy crafting explain the campaign’s legislative successes
in the states? In order to explain the passage of these resolutions, I make
use of variation over time and across states to draw inferences about the
correlates of passage. I estimate a series of discrete-time event history
models of the rate at which states adopted resolutions in favor of the
constitutional income tax rate limit of 25%. The unit of observation is
the state legislative session, so the rate of adoption can be understood as
the probability per session of adopting the amendment. I consider a state
to have been at risk for adopting a resolution in a particular legislative
session only if the state had not yet adopted one. No state was at risk
before 1938, when the campaign began, or after 1958, when it ended. I
estimate the model using a logit specification, with robust standard errors
clustered at the state level.
The independent variables include measures of democracy, party or-
ganization, and business mobilization. Following Amenta and Poulsen
(1996), I measure democracy by the natural logarithm of the percentage
of eligible adults who voted in the previous presidential election. This
measure is logged to emphasize the distinction between the underdemo-
cratized polities of the former Confederacy and other states, rather than
the fine distinctions among degrees of election turnout among comparably
democratic polities. I expect this variable to be negatively related to the
adoption of resolutions. To capture the nature of party organization, I
include the conventional measure of “traditional” or patronage party or-
ganization, an ordinal measure that ranges from one to five (Mayhew
1986). If we assume that the same factors predict the failure of spending
for the poor and the success of tax cuts for the rich, then we might expect
patronage organization to be positively related to adoption. But the logic
of institutional politics theory would probably suggest a negative rela-
tionship: patronage-oriented politicians should prefer discretionary tax
cuts to constitutional tax limitation.
I also include a measure of the number of legislative houses, from zero
to two, under control of the Republican Party. Republican state legislators
were closely allied with business (Chen 2005; Chen 2007), and in the period
considered here they were concentrated in the northern states that also
had the most high-income taxpayers. I therefore expect this measure to
be positively related to policy adoption.28
28 I omit a measure of Republican Party control of the governorship because Article
V of the Constitution explicitly empowers “the Legislatures of two thirds of the several
states” (emphasis added)—and not governors, or state governments more generally—
to call a constitutional convention. The governor’s veto was therefore irrelevant to
determining whether a state legislature had called for a convention. In supplemental
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The measure of grassroots business mobilization is the number of tax-
payer organizations compiled from a directory published by the Tax Policy
League in 1938 and 1939 (Tax Policy League 1938, 1939) and standardized
on the 1940 population (Haines, n.d.). This measure captures the legacy
of the “Tax Clubs” that were organized by the American Taxpayers’
League in the 1920s, as well as more recent business- and homeowner-
based taxpayer organizations of the Great Depression. I expect this mea-
sure to be positively related to policy adoption. Because the peaks of the
movement followed major expansions of the income tax, all of the models
control for the estimated percentage of personal tax returns that reported
income over the 25% marginal rate threshold (for details of how this
variable was estimated, see the appendix). Taxpayers over the 25% mar-
ginal rate threshold stood to gain something in the short run from the
constitutional tax limit, and I expect the greatest support in states and
years when these taxpayers were the most numerous.
The Institutional Politics Model and Policy Crafting
I begin by testing the institutional politics model without any attention
to policy design. Table 2 reports coefficient estimates and standard errors
from a discrete-time event history model. For ease of interpretation, the
table also reports first differences, or the changes in the predicted prob-
abilities of passing a resolution after an increase of 1 SD in each inde-
pendent variable, assuming that all other variables set at their central
tendency (the mean for continuous variables and the mode for categorical
variables).29 The institutional politics model is reported in the table as
model 1. It does not do very well at explaining the passage of resolutions.
Most of the coefficients have the hypothesized signs—voting rights are
negatively associated with passage, Republican party control is positively
associated with passage, and taxpayers’ organizations are positively as-
sociated with passage—but their magnitudes are not very great, and they
are not estimated with much certainty. A likelihood ratio test indicates
poor fit, so we can have little confidence that the model fits the data any
better than a constant-only model. In supplemental analyses, I tested
analyses, I nevertheless tested whether a dummy variable for unified Republican con-
trol over the legislature and the governorship mattered for the passage of resolutions;
see the appendix.
29 For variables that assume only whole number values—the indicator variable for a
constitutional tax limit, the count of legislative houses under Republican control, the
count of neighboring states that had passed resolutions, and the measure of traditional
party organization—I rounded the increase to the nearest whole number values so
that the predicted probabilities and first differences referred to logically tenable
counterfactuals.
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TABLE 2
Policy Crafting and the Passage of Resolutions Favoring
a Constitutional Tax Limit: Results from Discrete-Time
Logistic Event History Models
Model 2: Institutional Politics
and Policy Crafting
Model 1:
Institutional
Politics
No
Emergency
Clause (vs. No
Resolution)
With
Emergency
Clause (vs. No
Resolution)
Coeff. DP Coeff. DP Coeff. DP
High-bracket taxpayers (% of
returns) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .01
(.02)
.008 .04
(.04)
.005 .003
(.02)
.002
Voting rights (ln turnout in
last presidential election) . . . . .25
(.52)
.008 2.29*
(1.12)
.01 .18
(.47)
.005
Traditional party organization
(1–5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .03
(.15)
.005 .24
(.25)
.005 .13
(.17)
.01
Republican Party control (0–2
legislative houses) . . . . . . . . . . . . .20
(.25)
.01 1.63***
(.46)
.009 .11
(.25)
.007
Taxpayers’ organizations
(per 100,000 people, ca.
1939) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .04
(.11)
.005 .14
(.41)
.002 .03
(.10)
.002
Intercept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.61
(1.92)
2.81
(3.80)
3.18
(1.78)
LR x2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.24 8.853
BIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,162.416 2,099.255
Note.—Numbers in parentheses are SEs. .Np 402
 P ! .10.
* P ! .05.
** P ! .01.
*** P ! .001.
several different operationalizations of business power—including the
number of chambers of commerce (both raw and population standard-
ized), the number of manufacturing establishments per capita, and, as
an inverse measure of business power, the density of union membership
in the nonagricultural workforce—with no substantial improvement in
model fit (see app. table A2). I also tested several different operationali-
zations of Republican Party control, including a dummy variable for the
presence of a Republican majority in both houses of the state legislature;
a dummy variable for unified Republican control of both houses and the
governorship; a dummy variable for the presence of a Republican majority
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in at least one house of the legislature; and a continuous variable rep-
resenting the percentage of Republicans in the legislature’s largest house.
None of these alternative specifications improved the fit of the model
noticeably (see app. table A3). The institutional politics model alone does
not give us much explanatory purchase on the passage of state resolutions.
I have hypothesized that policy crafting allows advocates of upward-
redistributive policy to circumvent the constraints identified by institu-
tional politics theory. I test this hypothesis by distinguishing between two
versions of the amendment, both of which were circulated jointly by the
American Taxpayers Association and the committee. As I noted above,
early versions called for a blanket tax limitation regardless of circum-
stance, while later versions responded to wartime critics by adding an
“emergency clause” that permitted Congress to relax the limit in the event
of a grave national emergency. Model 2 is a multinomial logit model that
treats these two versions of the resolution as mutually exclusive alter-
natives. The results of this multinomial logit model are reported in four
columns of table 2, with a separate column for the coefficients and stan-
dard errors associated with each outcome and another separate column
for the changes in the predicted probability of each outcome for an oth-
erwise average state associated with each independent variable.
Distinguishing between these two ways of crafting the tax limitation
amendment reveals modest associations that are consistent with institu-
tional politics theory. In particular, the stringent version without the emer-
gency clause was less likely in states with widespread voting rights: a 1-
SD difference in voting rights meant a difference of 1% in the probability
of passage of this version for an otherwise average state, and the coefficient
for voting rights was statistically significant at . The stringentP ! .05
version was also somewhat more likely in a state where the Republican
Party controlled the legislature: in an otherwise average state where Re-
publicans controlled both houses of the legislature, the probability of
passage was almost 1% greater than if Democrats had controlled both
houses. Neither of these variables made a substantial difference for pas-
sage of the version with the emergency clause, suggesting that this new
way of crafting the policy permitted the campaign to succeed even in
otherwise unfavorable institutional environments. The overall fit of the
model remains poor because most resolutions contained the emergency
clause.
The main message of this table is that institutional politics theory alone
cannot account for upward-redistributive policy. The findings comport
with institutional politics theory insofar as they suggest that democracy
and reform-oriented political parties were constraints on upward-redis-
tributive policy. They are also consistent with my argument that this
theory needs to be supplemented by attention to policy crafting. The
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emergency clause permitted the tax limitation amendment to win legis-
lative endorsements even in contexts that did not resemble a riches-ori-
ented regime.
The Importance of Policy Context
I have hypothesized that advocacy groups may succeed by crafting their
proposals to fit the policy context. If this hypothesis is correct, then we
should find that the American Taxpayers Association and the committee
had the most success in states where their proposal fit the state policy
context.
I include three measures of policy context. The first is an indicator
variable for states that imposed constitutional limits on their state income
taxes (New York State Tax Commission and Commerce Clearing House
1940–52). A state was assigned a value of one if its constitution prohibited
the adoption of a state income tax, forbade graduated income tax rates,
or prescribed a maximum rate of tax. A total of 11 states met one or more
of these criteria. These states were at most a minority of the states adopting
resolutions, and we may infer that the presence of a constitutional tax
limitation was not a necessary condition for the passage of a resolution.
But because I hypothesize that passage was more likely where constitu-
tional tax limitation was most immediately salient, I expect these states
to have been more likely than other states to adopt resolutions.
The second measure of policy context is the number of neighboring
states that had passed resolutions in favor of any version of the Dresser
amendment in the previous two years. Because most state legislatures
met biennially, this variable generally captures resolutions passed in neigh-
boring states since the last legislative session. I assume that state legislators
in this period paid particular attention to legislation in adjacent states,
so that we should expect that the resolution was more salient—and there-
fore more likely to be adopted—where it had been passed recently by a
neighboring state legislature.
The third measure of policy context is the state’s share of total reported
spending on defense contracts (see the appendix for details). The Treasury
framed income tax paying as a patriotic purchase of military equipment
(Sparrow 2008), and the main policy trade-off stressed by opponents of
the amendment was the loss of defense capacity that it entailed. I thus
expect military spending in a state to be negatively associated with the
passage of resolutions in favor of tax limitation.
I find support for all three hypotheses. The results of the full model,
including coefficients for institutional politics and policy context measures,
appear as model 3 in table 3. Three coefficients are particularly note-
worthy. First, states with above-average military spending were substan-
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TABLE 3
Resolutions Favoring a Constitutional Tax Limit and the Policy Context:
Results from Discrete-Time Logistic Event History Models
Model 3:
Institutional Politics
and Policy Context
Model 4: Trimmed
Policy Context
Model
Coeff. DP Coeff. DP
High-bracket taxpayers (% of
returns) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .02
(.02)
.009
Voting rights (ln turnout in last
presidential election) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18
(.55)
.003
Traditional party organization
(1–5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .06
(.16)
.005
Republican Party control (0–2
legislative houses) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33
(.26)
.01
Taxpayers’ organizations (per 100,000
people, ca. 1939) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12
(.09)
.008
Share of military spending (0–.23) . . . . 21.08*
(10.05)
.03 18.82*
(8.72)
.03
State constitution limits income tax?
(1 p yes) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.20**
(.38)
.08 .96*
(.41)
.06
Public opposed to income tax (% of
respondents) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12**
(.04)
.03 .12**
(.04)
.03
Adjacent states passing resolutions in
previous 2 years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .69*
(.29)
.04 .58*
(.26)
.03
Intercept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.36*
(2.49)
6.61***
(1.33)
LR x2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22.835** 18.661**
BIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,160.026 2,185.834
Note.—Numbers in parentheses are SEs. .Np 402
* .P ! .05
** .P ! .01
*** .P ! .001
tially less likely to pass resolutions than were states with below-average
military spending (a difference of 3% in the predicted probability for an
otherwise average state). This finding is consistent with the expectation
that the campaign was most successful where the budgetary trade-off
between tax limitation and military spending was least salient to policy
makers. Second, states with constitutional income tax limitations of their
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own were also substantially more likely to pass resolutions in favor of
federal tax limitation (a difference of 8% in the predicted probability for
an otherwise average state). Third, states whose neighbors had passed
the resolution were more likely to do so (a difference of 4% in the predicted
probability for an otherwise average state). The latter two findings suggest
that the familiarity of the policy proposal helped advocates of the amend-
ment. A likelihood ratio test indicates that this institutional politics and
policy context model fits the data significantly better than chance (P !
)..05
But are these causal effects of policy context or spurious correlations?
The coefficient for constitutional tax limitations might arise spuriously if
both state tax limitations and state resolutions in favor of federal tax
limitation responded to the preferences of the electorate. The coefficient
for the passage of resolutions in adjacent states might also arise spuriously
if neighboring states share similarities of public opinion or political cul-
ture. This alternative interpretation would be consistent with much recent
work in political sociology that emphasizes the effect of public opinion
on public policy (Manza and Cook 2002; Burstein 2003, 2005; Brooks and
Manza 2007). In order to test whether policy context had an effect in-
dependent of voter preferences, I therefore controlled directly for public
opinion toward the income tax. Following a method pioneered by Erikson,
Wright, and McIver (1993), I constructed a time-constant, state-level mea-
sure of public opinion by pooling 10 national samples from Gallup polls
conducted in the period 1938–59. I measure opposition to income tax as
the percentage of respondents in the state who described their income tax
burden as either “unfair” or “too high,” out of all respondents in that state
who answered either question (see the appendix for details). I expect this
variable to be positively associated with policy adoption.
Public opinion does appear to have influenced the passage of resolution.
Model 3 implies that increasing public opposition to the income tax by 1
SD would increase the probability of passage by 3%. The coefficient is
sharply estimated ( ).P ! .01
But public opinion did not make as much of a difference as the policy
context variables did. Nor did its inclusion attenuate the coefficients for
the policy context variables, all of which are substantial and sharply
estimated in model 3. It is worth noting that this model presents the
strongest evidence I could find for the effect of public opinion. In sup-
plemental analyses, I retested model 3 with a variety of other time-in-
variant controls for state political culture and public opinion, including
the percentage of survey respondents from two Gallup polls who specif-
ically said that they favored a limitation of some kind on the rate of
income tax, the percentage of survey respondents in later decades who
identified themselves as “conservative” (see Erikson et al. 1993), a measure
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of the degree to which the state’s political culture was “individualistic”
according to the classic interpretive coding of Elazar ([1966] 1984), and
a categorical variable to measure previous opposition to the Sixteenth
Amendment (see the appendix for data sources and details). None of these
control variables for ideology or political culture was associated with the
passage of resolutions, and none of them measurably attenuated the co-
efficients for the policy context variables (see app. table A4). Because
model 3 includes many variables that differ widely between the South
and the rest of the country, it is also possible that the coefficients for policy
context in the full model are spurious proxies for other unmeasured cul-
tural or institutional differences among regions. To be sure that the policy
context coefficients merit a substantive interpretation, I tested model 3
and subsequent models in a smaller sample that excluded the 11 states
of the former Confederacy. The pattern of results was again similar, with
the exception of the coefficient for voting rights. Most importantly for my
purposes, the coefficients for policy context were not attenuated (see app.
table A5).30
The full model contains a large number of independent variables rel-
ative to the number of resolutions that were introduced, producing a low
event-per-variable ratio and a risk of substantial bias in estimated coef-
ficients (see Peduzzi et al. 1995). In order to test whether the coefficient
estimates were robust, I therefore estimated a trimmed model that omitted
every independent variable whose coefficient was not statistically signif-
icant at the level (following Chen 2007). The resulting trimmedP ! .15
model, reported as model 4, includes all of the policy context variables
as well as the control variable for public opinion. Model 4 is the best-
fitting model: the reduction in Raftery’s BIC provides very strong support
for this trimmed model over either the institutional politics model (model
2) or the full model (model 3). The coefficient estimates and the estimated
first differences are comparable to those in the full model. The trimmed
model provides further evidence that both public opinion and policy con-
text played independent parts in explaining the passage of this upward-
redistributive policy.
Policy Crafting and the Policy Process
These models provide evidence that the American Taxpayers Association
and the Committee for Constitutional Government had the most success
where their policy proposals fit the state policy context. But one might
still plausibly interpret these results as evidence for the effects of voter
30 The coefficient for voting rights was positive in models excluding the states of the
former Confederacy, but it was not statistically distinguishable from zero.
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preferences, despite the inclusion of an explicit control for public opinion.
The measurement of public opinion is subject to error, and it is possible
that measures of policy context themselves are merely proxies for the
underlying preferences of the electorate. Can we be sure that the coefficient
for the presence of resolutions in neighboring states, for example, repre-
sents the effects of policy imitation, or might it simply represent additional,
unmeasured variation in voter preferences?
A further way to adjudicate between these interpretations is to dis-
aggregate the policy process into discrete stages. Political sociologists have
argued that the preferences of voters are most likely to affect policy mak-
ers’ decisions when the policy in question is particularly salient to the
public (Burstein 1998, 2003, 2005). We may test this hypothesis by dis-
tinguishing between early and later stages of the campaign. Early in the
campaign, there was little publicity for the proposal, and the committee
and the American Taxpayers Association labored assiduously to prevent
it from becoming salient to the public. After 1944, the campaign was
much better publicized, and studies by the Treasury Department and the
Gallup organization gave policy makers much more information about
the likely fiscal and electoral consequences of a constitutional tax limi-
tation. If the policy context variables are proxies for public opinion, we
would expect them to have a greater effect after 1944.
On the other hand, if the policy context variables measure the oppor-
tunities for policy imitation and policy obfuscation, then we should expect
their effects to vary depending on the measure of policy context. Before
1944, we should expect opportunities for policy imitation to have their
greatest effect. The decision by state legislators to pass the resolution at
this stage was akin to a decision to put tax limitation on the agenda. I
expect the opportunity for policy imitation—as measured by the presence
of a recent resolution in a neighboring state or a prior state-level tax
limitation—had its greatest effect at this stage. After 1944, the problem
for state legislators changed into one of definitive policy choice: as the
number of states with resolutions approached the threshold for calling a
constitutional convention, any state that passed the resolution risked being
the one that put the convention over the top. At this stage, the opportunity
for policy obfuscation should be more consequential, and I expect the
presence of competing policy priorities—in particular, the salience of mil-
itary spending in the state—to be more important at this stage.
I test these hypotheses with the models reported in table 4. Model 5a
reports the results of the event history through 1944, and model 5b reports
the results for 1945–58. These models support the hypothesis that some
measures of the policy context mattered more in the early stages of the
movement, before the proposed tax limit was highly salient to the public.
Up to and until the 1944 legislation, the presence of a state-level consti-
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TABLE 4
Impact of Policy Context at Early and Late Stages of the Policy Process:
Results from Discrete-Time Logistic Event History Models of Resolution
Passage and Introduction
Model 5a (1938–44) Model 5b (1945–58)
Coeff. DP Coeff. DP
Share of military spending
(0–.23) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.66
(11.00)
.02 171.88
(93.75)
.05
State constitution limits income
tax? (1 p yes) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.02
(.54)
.08 1.21
(.64)
.003
Public opposed to income tax (%
of respondents) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12*
(.06)
.03 .05
(.05)
.0004
Adjacent states passing resolu-
tions in previous 2 years . . . . . . . . 1.57**
(.46)
.16 .16
(.44)
.0002
Intercept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.68**
(2.04)
3.77*
(1.66)
N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 265
LR x2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17.938** 15.593**
BIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 564.628 13,62.587
Note.—Models 5a and 5b represent the first and second stages of institutional politics and policy
contexts. Numbers in parentheses are SEs.
 .P ! .10
* .P ! .05
** .P ! .01
tutional tax limit made an otherwise average state 8% more likely to pass
a resolution, while the presence of a neighboring state that had passed a
resolution made an otherwise average state 3% more likely to pass a
resolution, according to model 5a. But model 5b shows that after 1944
these same indicators of policy familiarity were less strongly associated
with the passage of resolutions. The presence of a constitutional tax limit
only increased the probability of passage by 3%. The passage of a reso-
lution in an adjacent state had no measurable effect on the probability
of passage in an otherwise average state during the later years of the
campaign. These findings appear consistent with a policy context inter-
pretation of these variables and inconsistent with an interpretation of
them as proxies for voter preferences.
The models also support the hypothesis that policy obfuscation was
more important in later stages of the policy process. Model 5a shows that
an increase of 1 SD in a state’s share of military prime contract awards
would decrease its probability of passing a resolution by 2% during the
early years of the campaign, all else being equal, a small effect that is not
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statistically significant at conventional levels. The same increase in mil-
itary spending would have decreased the same state’s probability of pass-
ing a resolution by 5% during the later years of the campaign, when the
policy trade-off between tax limitation and national defense was more
salient to legislators. This finding, too, is consistent with a policy context
interpretation.
A second way to adjudicate between the public opinion and policy
context interpretations of these coefficients is to distinguish between the
introduction and the passage of resolutions (see Mintrom 1997; King et
al. 2005; Soule and King 2006). Even in the later stages of the campaign,
introduction of a resolution in a state legislature was a relatively low-
commitment exercise that required the action of only one state legislator
and carried little risk that voters would hold that legislator accountable.
By contrast, voting for passage required greater commitment. Passage
required a majority of legislators (in most legislatures, a majority in each
of two houses), and it carried a higher risk that voters would be able to
hold those legislators accountable for the consequences of their decision.
Thus, if the policy context measures are mere proxies for public opinion,
then we might expect them to matter more for the passage of resolutions,
when electoral considerations were likely to be more salient to policy
makers. Alternatively, if these variables measure the opportunities for
policy imitation and policy obfuscation, then we should expect their effects
to differ between the introduction and passage stages. I expect that op-
portunities for policy imitation—as indicated by the presence of state tax
limitations and the recent passage of resolutions in adjacent states—mat-
tered more for the introduction of resolutions, when decision makers were
looking to narrow the range of alternatives. I expect that military spending
mattered more for the passage of resolutions, when policy makers had to
weigh competing priorities based on information about their respective
consequences.
I test these hypotheses by estimating two logistic regression models,
one for the introduction of a resolution (model 6) and another for the
passage of a resolution conditional on introduction in that legislative ses-
sion (model 7). I report these models in table 5. The coefficients in model
6 provide mixed evidence for the hypothesis that policy imitation mattered
for the introduction of resolutions. A state whose neighbors had passed
resolutions was indeed more likely to introduce a resolution itself: one
neighboring resolution made a difference of 18% in the probability that
an otherwise average state would pass a resolution of its own. Consistent
with the policy context interpretation, the same variable did not increase
the likelihood that a state would pass a resolution once it had been in-
troduced—to the contrary, it decreased the probability of passage slightly
(a difference of 5% in the predicted probability for an average state, not
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TABLE 5
Impact of Policy Context at Early and Late Stages of the Policy Process:
Results from Discrete-Time Logistic Event History Models of Resolution
Passage and Introduction
Model 6: Dependent
Variable Is
Introduction of
Resolution
Model 7: Dependent
Variable Is Passage
of Resolution
Conditional on
Introduction
Coeff. DP Coeff. DP
Share of military spending
(0–.23) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.89
(4.85)
.009 21.58*
(10.28)
.20
State constitution limits income
tax? (1 p yes) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30
(.27)
.04 1.17
(.76)
.28
Public opposed to income tax (%
of respondents) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .05
(.03)
.03 .12*
(.06)
.15
Adjacent states passing resolu-
tions in previous 2 years . . . . . . . . 1.07***
(.24)
.18 .23
(.24)
.05
Intercept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.45
(.92)
4.22*
(2.01)
N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 402 75
LR x2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30.67*** 12.445*
BIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,024.371 213.718
Note.—Numbers in parentheses are SEs.
 .P ! .10
* .P ! .05
** .P ! .01
*** .P ! .001
statistically significant). This difference between model 6 and model 7
represents a statistically significant attenuation of the measured effect of
diffusion.31
By contrast, the coefficients for the presence of a state constitutional
income tax limitation do not support the policy context hypothesis. Al-
though model 6 shows that states with income tax limitations were more
likely to introduce resolutions than states without them (a difference of
4% in the predicted probability for an otherwise average state), the co-
efficient was statistically insignificant at conventional levels, and model
31 I computed a 95% confidence interval for each predicted first difference using the
delta method (see Long and Freese 2006, p. 127). The confidence interval for the
predicted first difference for introducing a resolution did not overlap with the confi-
dence interval for the predicted first difference for passing a resolution.
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7 shows that income tax limitations also made a dramatic difference at
the passage stage. Neither coefficient is statistically significant at conven-
tional levels, so this evidence does not help adjudicate between public
opinion and political context interpretations.
Models 6 and 7 also show that the policy trade-off with defense spending
was more consequential at the passage stage, as hypothesized. An oth-
erwise average state was barely less likely to introduce a resolution if it
had a greater share of military contracts than other states (a difference
of less than 1% in the likelihood of introducing a resolution). But it was
dramatically less likely to pass a resolution once it was introduced: model
7 implies that the probability of passage would fall by 20% as the share
of military spending increased by 1 SD. This difference across models in
the magnitude of the first differences approaches but does not attain
statistical significance at the conventional .05 level.
What of the explicit control for public opinion? As might be predicted
by theories of democratic responsiveness (Burstein 2003; Brooks and
Manza 2007), the effect of public opinion was greater at the passage stage,
when policy makers were forced to make a definitive decision to pass a
resolution and therefore forced to consider the risk that they would be
held accountable for that decision by voters. Model 6 implies that an
increase of 1 SD in public opposition to the income tax would have made
a difference of 3% in the likelihood that an otherwise average state would
introduce the resolution, whereas model 7 implies that the same increase
would have made an increase of 15% in the likelihood that such a state
would pass the resolution once it had been introduced. This difference
appears substantial, although the loss of statistical power associated with
the reduction in sample size from model 6 to model 7 means that the
difference in measured effect size is not itself statistically significant at
the .05 level.
On balance, the statistical evidence presented here thus supports the
view that policy context mattered for the success of the campaign to repeal
the Sixteenth Amendment. As expected, advocates of upward redistri-
bution succeeded initially by crafting their proposals to imitate policies
salient to legislators, and they succeeded in the later stages of the policy
process by crafting proposals to obfuscate competing fiscal priorities. The
models also provide evidence that crafting the policy to fit the salient
policy context is not the same as crafting the policy to fit the preferences
of the voting public—although there is evidence here that public opinion
also mattered for the success of the campaign. The general theoretical
implication is that advocates of upward redistribution need not wait for
a riches-oriented regime; even in otherwise unfavorable institutional en-
vironments, they may succeed by crafting their policy proposals to fit the
policy context and the preferences of the public.
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Finally, these statistical models also allow us to discover just how close
the movement came to victory by allowing us to predict legislative sessions
where the resolution would have been likely to pass if only it had been
introduced. The models identify two promising states, Washington and
North Carolina. The policy context in both states was propitious. Both
had constitutional provisions limiting the use of state income tax; they
were, in fact, the only two such states that did not pass the resolution.
Both states also had comparatively few military contracts. Though both
were coastal states with substantial military presence, the war was less
salient here than in other coastal states that were greater centers of war
production and mobilization (see, e.g., Cooke 2006, pp. 128–32, 180–85).
Activists nearly succeeded in North Carolina. The campaign in that
state was led by a traveling lobbyist affiliated with the Western Tax
Council, who persuaded sympathetic state legislators to introduce the
amendment on February 9, 1951. The Senate Committee on Constitu-
tional Amendments reported it out favorably on February 27. But a vote
sent it back to the committee the next day, where it languished until the
adjournment of the session.32 Had the activists introduced their resolution
in an earlier session—say, in 1943, the year of the campaign’s greatest
success, and before the Treasury Department and Representative Patman
exposed the campaign to the light of day—the model predicts that it would
have passed.
The campaign also came close to success in Washington State. Activists
succeeded in introducing the resolution in Washington in 1945, but this
legislative session coincided with the peak of the American war effort,
and it was the first legislative session since Patman and the Treasury
Department had launched their public criticism of the amendment as an
unpatriotic threat to the American soldiers overseas. The resolution died
in committee. Despite this failure, there is no evidence in Patman’s vo-
luminous correspondence with state officials that there was any mobilized
opposition in Washington State, in or out of the legislature. Had the
activists returned in any one of the next seven legislative sessions, the
model predicts that they would have succeeded with probability greater
than 50%. Perhaps they need only have kept trying.
CONCLUDING IMPLICATIONS FOR POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY
I have treated the campaign to repeal the Sixteenth Amendment as a case
study in the politics of upward-redistributive policy. Such policy is com-
32 Charles Delphenis to Hon. Wright Patman, August 21, 1951, folder “Booklets and
Pamphlets on the Tax Limitation Amendment”; and untitled spreadsheet, n.d., ca.
1952, folder “Status of States on Millionaires’ Amendment,” both in box 108A, WP.
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paratively rare in democratic states, for reasons that are well articulated
by institutional politics theory: the rich are few, and the fiscal and political
costs of openly catering to their interests can be prohibitive for elected
officials. But upward-redistributive policy is worth studying precisely be-
cause the costs of such policy are so high. Had Robert Dresser succeeded
in amending the constitution as he wished, the Joint Economic Committee
of Congress estimated that in the short term it would have cost the Trea-
sury $13.1 billion annually in current 1961 dollars, and in the long run
it would have required the federal government to introduce a heavy sales
tax, run ruinous deficits, or cut virtually all domestic discretionary spend-
ing (U.S. Senate and House of Representatives Joint Economic Committee
1961). Another way to grasp what might have been is to contemplate the
upward-redistributive tax cuts enacted by the 107th Congress in 2001,
when the EGTRRA gradually reduced top marginal income tax rates,
introduced and expanded various other income tax cuts, and repealed
estate taxes altogether. In the short run, the annual cost was comparable
to the projected cost of Robert Dresser’s proposed constitutional amend-
ment (Joint Committee on Taxation 2001).33 In the long run, the conse-
quences of EGTRRA, while difficult to predict—and difficult to measure,
given their likely confounding by the great recession that began in De-
cember 2007 and the policy responses to that recession—seem likely to
include greater income inequality along with some combination of sub-
stantial spending cuts, regressive taxes, and sustained deficits of a mag-
nitude that may be quite harmful for economic growth (see Jones and
Williams 2008, chap. 8). The perceived need to rein in these long-term
deficits continues to constrain the fiscal policy proposals of the current
Democratic administration. Had such a restrictive fiscal formula been
written into the Constitution in 1957, the course of American history in
the late 20th century might have been very different. It is hard to imagine,
for example, that the extraordinary burst of creative social policy making
that occurred in the early 1960s would have taken place under a stringent
constitutional tax limitation.
Given the potentially dire consequences of repealing the Sixteenth
Amendment, the puzzle is why the campaign came as close to success as
it did. I have addressed this puzzle by extending the institutional politics
model and sociological theories of the policy process to encompass policy
33 The comparison is complicated by the phase-in provisions of EGTRRA. The Joint
Economic Committee estimated the cost of Robert Dresser’s 25% marginal income tax
rate limit at $13.1 billion in 1961, or $77.3 billion in 2001 dollars inflated by the
consumer price index for all urban consumers. The estimated cost of EGTRRA in
fiscal year 2001 was $73.8 billion. By 2009, however, the estimated annual cost of
EGTRRA more than doubled, far outstripping the initial annual cost of Robert
Dresser’s proposed constitutional amendment.
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crafting. Advocates of upward-redistributive policy succeed in part by
designing their proposals to fit the policy context. In particular, they craft
their policies to attract legislative support by imitation—patterning pro-
posals on familiar policies—and by obfuscation, or drafting proposals in
ways that obscure their costs. These findings are consistent with recent
research that demonstrates the effect of policy design on upward-redis-
tributive policy, and especially with the findings of Hacker and Pierson
(2005a, 2005b) concerning the role of policy manipulation in the 2001 tax
cuts.
Future research should explore the impact of these campaigns on dis-
tributional outcomes. My research design focused on the success or failure
of advocacy groups’ explicit demands. But the impacts of social movement
organizations and other advocacy groups may extend beyond the changes
that they explicitly demand to include other outcomes that may not be
directly intended or foreseen (Amenta et al. 1999a). For example, mobi-
lization for extreme upward-redistributive policy proposals may serve as
a “radical flank” (Haines 1984) that helps policies of the right by making
them seem comparatively reasonable. Sociologists have found quantitative
evidence that militant protest by the black poor may have had a radical
flank effect on the left wing of tax debates, thereby increasing the pro-
gressivity of the income tax (Jacobs and Helms 2001). It is a question of
considerable interest whether grassroots mobilization of the rich and their
allies has had a comparable radical flank effect on the right (see Akard
1992).
Future research on social movements and public policy should also test
the effects of policy crafting beyond the context of upward-redistributive
policy. I have argued that policy crafting is particularly important for
advocates of upward-redistributive policy, but the theoretical arguments
offered here imply that it is also likely to be important for other advocacy
groups. Studies of policy-oriented social movements have explored the
impact of the tactical choices that protesters make when they stand up
for their interests, including the choices to be assertive or accommodating
(Amenta, Halfmann, and Young 1999b; Amenta 2005b), violent or peace-
ful (Gamson [1975] 1990), and demonstrative or disruptive (Kriesi et al.
1995). It is also worth studying the tactical choices that such challengers
make when they sit down to write their own policy proposals. Studies of
the political effects of strategic policy crafting may provide an important
bridge between studies of social movements and studies of public policy.
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APPENDIX
Quantitative Data Sources
The best source for data on the passage of state resolutions in favor of
constitutional tax limitation is a report published by the U.S. Senate and
House of Representatives Joint Economic Committee (1961), which cor-
rects errors in previous government publications and in the publications
of the American Taxpayers Association. It is much more difficult to obtain
data on the introduction of resolutions that failed to pass. Especially in
the early years of the movement, the American Taxpayers Association
and the Committee for Constitutional Government took pains to avoid
publicity when the resolutions were introduced, and they rarely reported
their failures after the fact. State legislative journals from this period do
not provide sufficient information to identify where and when a resolution
was introduced. I relied on data compiled by Congressman Wright Pat-
man’s repeated mail surveys of state officials, supplemented by various
publications of the American Taxpayers Association and the Committee
on Constitutional Government (see esp. American Taxpayers Association
1955) and by the hearing record provided to Congress (Subcommittee No.
3 on the Judiciary of the U.S. House of Representatives 1958).34 None of
these sources distinguished systematically between versions of the amend-
ment that were introduced, so the comparison of the success rates of
versions with and without the emergency clause (see model 2) is limited
to resolutions that actually passed.
The independent variables for the analysis are described in the text.
Appendix table A1 reports summary statistics for all of the independent
variables. A few independent variables require more extensive discussion.
High-Bracket Taxpayers
The percentage of tax returns in high brackets refers to the estimated
percentage of all federal personal income tax returns above the 25% mar-
ginal rate threshold. The statutory rate schedule did not always include
a threshold with a marginal rate of precisely 25%; for the purposes of
this analysis, the 25% marginal rate threshold refers to the lowest income
for which the marginal tax rate was equal to or greater than 25%. I
computed the percentage of income tax returns whose reported income
was sufficient to place their marginal income tax rate at or above 25%
34 Handwritten spreadsheets summarizing Patman’s surveys of state officials on the
status of state resolutions are collected in the folder “Status of States on Millionaires’
Amendment,” box 108A, WP.
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from the Statistics of Income annual published by the Internal Revenue
Service (1938–59).
The reported data had two complications that required the imputation
of missing values. The first was the absence of reporting by filing status.
After 1948, the 25% marginal rate threshold differed according to filing
status (married filing jointly, married filing separately, single, or head of
household). The published tables of income tax returns by income class
by state do not distinguish returns by filing status. For those years in
which the threshold differed by filing status, I therefore allocated the
returns of each income class to filing statuses within each state according
to the reported proportions of each filing status within that income class
in the country as a whole.
The second complication was the problem of mismatched thresholds.
The income thresholds used to separate income classes in published sta-
tistics did not always match the income thresholds used to distinguish tax
brackets in the Internal Revenue Code. For those years and filing statuses
for which published data did not report an exact number above the 25%
marginal rate threshold, I therefore imputed the number of returns above
the threshold by assuming that income was Pareto distributed within each
filing status within each state. I estimated a separate Pareto distribution
for each filing status, state, and year, according to the quantile method
recommended by Quandt (1966). I used the parameters from this distri-
bution to impute the number of returns above the 25% marginal tax rate
threshold. I then added together the number of estimated returns above
the 25% marginal tax rate threshold for each filing status and divided by
the total number of returns, to yield the total proportion of all tax returns
above the 25% marginal tax rate threshold.
The IRS did not publish data on returns by income class by state for
1944. I therefore imputed 1944 values at the 1945 level, since tax rate
thresholds did not change from 1944 to 1945.
Military Spending
The share of military contracts was compiled from data on the net dollar
value of military prime contract awards by state reported by the War
Production Board (1943) and the U.S. Department of Defense (1983). The
reporting for the period 1940–43 was cumulative, not annual, but annual
data could be inferred. The construction of a consistent time series from
these data posed two problems. First, publication of annual data began
only with the fiscal year ending in 1941 and was interrupted from 1944
to 1950. Second, spending on contracts was only included if the contract
met a minimum dollar threshold that varied from year to year: pub-
lications from the early 1940s report the aggregate value of all contracts
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over $50,000, while publications for the period after 1950 report the ag-
gregate value of all contracts above $10,000—both in current dollars, so
that the real value of the threshold varied even when the nominal thresh-
old remained constant from year to year. The solution to both problems
was to convert each observation from the dollar value of spending into
the state’s share of total reported spending on military prime contracts,
following Markusen et al. (1991). This variable permits imputation of
missing values with greater confidence, because a state’s share of reported
prime contract awards fluctuated only modestly from year to year even
during a period with major fluctuations in overall defense spending (the
average correlation for observations of the same state between any pair
of reported years was ). I imputed values for 1938–40 by assumingrp .84
shares were constant at the 1941 level, and I imputed values for 1944–
50 by assuming shares were constant at the 1943 level. I am confident
that these data accurately capture the geographic distribution of defense
contracts. Markusen et al. (1991) report that the state shares of defense
contracts began to shift only after the Korean War, at which point the
data are based on annual observations reported in Defense Department
publications.
Public Opinion
Public opposition to income tax was measured from survey data. I iden-
tified 10 Gallup polls conducted between 1938 and 1959 that had similarly
worded questions on opinion toward the federal income tax and for which
data on the respondent’s state were available. Six of these polls asked
whether the respondent perceived her income tax burden to be “too high,
too low, or about right” (Gallup polls 611 [1959], 1952-0486, 1951-0471,
1949-0439, 1947-0408, and 392 [1947]). Four of these polls asked whether
the respondent perceived her income tax burden to be “fair” (Gallup polls
1946-0366, 1945-0342, 1944-0313, and 1943-0290). I pooled opinion across
both questions and calculated the proportion of respondents in each state
who responded that the income tax was either unfair or too high, out of
all respondents in that state who answered either question. I chose to pool
across questions as a conservative strategy in the face of small samples
and imperfect measurement of the underlying construct (opposition to
high income tax rates).
This procedure of pooling from national samples to derive state-specific
opinion scores follows Erikson et al. (1993). They note that Gallup’s sam-
pling procedure was not designed to be representative at the state level.
All respondents from a given state might come from one or a few primary
sampling units in that state. This sampling procedure could bias estimates
of state-level means and proportions from these data.
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Individualistic Political Culture
The supplemental analyses include a measure of individualistic political
culture. I derived this measure from Sharkansky’s (1969) quantitative
scale, which is based on Elazar’s ([1966] 1984) interpretive coding of state
political culture. Elazar coded state political cultures as combinations of
three discrete categories: traditionalism, moralism, and individualism. The
last of the three is understood to represent a culture that prizes instru-
mental rationality and favors private property over government inter-
vention. Sharkansky reduced Elazar’s interpretive scheme to a one-di-
mensional scale ranging from one (for purely moralistic cultures) to nine
(for purely traditionalistic cultures), with pure individualism at the mid-
point of the scale. This scale correlated with a wide variety of indices of
state public policy from tax and welfare effort to suffrage restrictions
(Sharkansky 1969).
I extracted a measure of individualistic political culture (individualism)
by folding this variable X at the midpoint, according to the formula:
Individualismp {X, if X ≤ 5; 10 X, if X 1 5}.
Public Support for Tax Limitation
The supplemental analyses include a measure of public support for federal
income tax limitation. The Gallup organization polled several times on
support for a limit on the federal income tax rate, and two polls from the
mid-1950s also recorded data on the respondent’s state, enabling us to
pool responses within states for a time-constant, state-level measure of
the percentage of respondents expressing favorable opinions of tax limi-
tation. The two survey questions were:
It has been suggested that a law be passed so the federal government could
not take more than 35 per cent or about one-third, of any person’s income
in taxes. Would you favor or oppose this 35 per cent limit? (Gallup poll
1955-0541)
and
The government now takes a large part of the income of well-to-do persons.
Many states are asking that the Constitution be changed to place an income
tax limit of 25% to 35% on what any person would have to pay. This would
mean that the government would lose money which it would have to raise
by other kinds of taxes. Would you favor or oppose changing the Consti-
tution to place a top limit of 25% to 35% on the amount of income tax
which any person would have to pay? (Gallup poll 1957-0584).
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In comparison to state-level sample sizes for the other public opinion
variable, state-level sample sizes for this variable were quite small, and
this measure may be correspondingly less reliable.
Union Members as a Percentage of the Nonagricultural Workforce
The supplemental analyses include a measure of union membership as a
percentage of the nonagricultural workforce. State-level union density
data for 1939 and 1957 are reported by Troy (1957). Interpolation for the
intervening years (and extrapolation to 1938 and 1958) was complicated
by the fact that union growth during this period of American history was
nonlinear, with a dramatic expansion during the late 1940s followed by
a plateau. I therefore imputed missing values by assuming that the rate
of change in union density within each state was proportional to the rate
of change in union density for the entire U.S. workforce. I calculated the
imputed value for each state for year t according to the formula:
State value in year tp State value in year 1939
 [(US value for year tUS value for year 1939)
 (US value for 1957US value for 1939)]
# (State value for 1957 State value for 1939).
Annual union density data for the U.S. were reported by Troy (1965).
Note on Archival Sources
The following archival sources are cited by abbreviation in the footnotes.
CCG: Committee for Constitutional Government, ephemera, University
of Iowa Right Wing Collection, microfilm, reel 36. This microfilmed col-
lection includes periodicals, occasional mailings, and some correspondence
of the committee.
ATA: American Taxpayers Association, Tax Information Series, Uni-
versity of Iowa Right Wing Collection, microfilm, reel 8. This microfilmed
collection includes the occasional periodical Tax Information Series from
the American Taxpayers Association.
WP: Wright Patman Personal Papers, Lyndon Baines Johnson Me-
morial Library, Austin, Texas. This manuscript collection includes several
boxes of material related to the campaign to repeal the Sixteenth Amend-
ment, including correspondence and interoffice memoranda related to Pat-
man’s effort to monitor the progress of the campaign; propaganda for
and against constitutional tax limitation, including a thorough collection
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of books and pamphlets published by the American Taxpayers Association
and the committee; and Patman’s own speeches on the subject.
TABLE A1
Descriptive Statistics
Mean SD Min Max
High-bracket taxpayers (% of
returns) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 11 0 58
Voting rights (ln turnout) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.0 .5 2.3 4.4
Traditional party organization (1–5) . . . . . . 2 2 1 5
Republican Party control (no. of
houses) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 0 2
Taxpayers’ organizations (per 100,000
people) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 1.8 0 9.3
Share of military spending (out of 1) . . . . . .02 .04 0 .23
State constitution limits income tax?
(1 p yes) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2 .4 0 1
Public opposed to income tax (%) . . . . . . . . 34 6 22 53
Chambers of commerce (N) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110 84 11 325
Chambers of commerce (per capita) . . . . . . .006 .004 .001 .02
Manufacturing establishments (per
capita) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 .05 .05 .3
Union members (%) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 11 4 55
Any Republican house (1 p yes) . . . . . . . . . .6 .5 0 1
Republican legislators (% of most
numerous house) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 30 0 99
Republican Party control (1 p both
houses) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4 .5 0 1
Individualistic political culture (1–5) . . . . . 3 1 1 5
Public favoring tax limit (%) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 16 0 64
Conservative public (%) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 4 28 44
State opposed Sixteenth Amendment?
(1 p opposed, 1 p ratified, 0p both
or neither) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6 .6 1 1
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Results from Discrete-Time Logistic Event History Analyses of Passage
with Alternative Specifications of Business Power
(Compare to Model 1, Table 2)
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
High-bracket taxpayers (% of
returns) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .01
(.02)
.01
(.02)
.01
(.02)
.00
(.02)
Voting rights (ln turnout in last
presidential election) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19
(.49)
.22
(.53)
.17
(.49)
.04
(.53)
Traditional party organization (1–5) . . . . . . .04
(.14)
.03
(.18)
.04
(.16)
.01
(.14)
Republican Party control (0–2 legislative
houses) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21
(.25)
.19
(.25)
.35
(.27)
.19
(.24)
Chambers of commerce (ca. 1936) . . . . . . . . .00
(.00)
Chambers of commerce per capita (ca.
1936) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.90
(55.25)
Manufacturing establishments per capita
(ca. 1939) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.15
(5.41)
Union members (% of nonagricultural
workers) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .03
(.02)
Intercept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.68
(1.86)
1.70
(1.87)
1.45
(1.87)
2.18
(1.92)
N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 402 402 402 402
LR x2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.243 1.124 2.89 2.718
df . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5 5 5
BIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,162.419 2,162.3 2,164.066 2,163.895
Note.—Numbers in parentheses are SEs.
TABLE A3
Results from Discrete-Time Logistic Event History Analyses of Passage
with Alternative Specifications of Republican Party Control
(Compare to Model 1, Table 2)
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
High-bracket taxpayers (% of
returns) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .009
(.02)
.007
(.02)
.01
(.02)
.01
(.02)
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TABLE A3 (Continued)
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
Voting rights (ln turnout in last
presidential election) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38
(.54)
.10
(.61)
.21
(.51)
.13
(.50)
Traditional party organization (1–5) . . . . . . .03
(.15)
.05
(.15)
.04
(.15)
.03
(.15)
Taxpayers’ organizations (per 100,000
people, ca. 1939) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .03
(.11)
.07
(.09)
.06
(.11)
.05
(.11)
Any Republican house (1 p yes) . . . . . . . . . .58
(.49)
Republican Party share (%) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .002
(.009)
Republican Party control of legislature
(1 p both houses) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36
(.49)
Republican Party control of government
(1 p both houses and
governorship) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24
(.49)
Intercept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.22
(1.97)
2.13
(2.16)
1.72
(1.88)
1.98
(1.85)
N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 402 384 402 402
LR x2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.984 .86 1.268 .870
df . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5 5 5
BIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,163.16 2,044.616 2,162.444 2,162.047
Note.—Numbers in parentheses are SEs.
TABLE A4
Results from Discrete-Time Logistic Event History Analyses of Passage
with Alternative Specifications of Ideology (Compare to Model 3, Table 3)
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
High-bracket taxpayers (% of
returns) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .02
(.02)
.02
(.02)
.02
(.02)
.02
(.02)
Voting rights (ln turnout in last
presidential election) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42
(.59)
.22
(.59)
.16
(.53)
.33
(.56)
Traditional party organization (1–5) . . . . . . .08
(.17)
.10
(.16)
.16
(.18)
.11
(.16)
Republican Party control (0–2 legislative
houses) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43
(.27)
.66*
(.31)
.43
(.26)
.40
(.26)
Taxpayers’ organizations (per 100,000
people, ca. 1939) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .05
(.12)
.33
(.38)
.11
(.14)
.09
(.13)
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TABLE A4 (Continued)
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
Share of military spending . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.64
(9.35)
15.03
(8.35)
10.11
(9.38)
11.88
(8.76)
State constitution limits income tax?
(1 p yes) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.22**
(.39)
1.09*
(.45)
1.22**
(.41)
1.11**
(.40)
Adjacent states passing resolutions in
previous 2 years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .63*
(.27)
.76*
(.31)
.62*
(.28)
.66*
(.27)
Individualistic political culture (1–5) . . . . . .23
(.24)
Public favoring tax limit (%) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .01
(.02)
Conservative public (%) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .06
(.06)
State opposed Sixteenth Amendment?
(1 if ratified; 1 if rejected) . . . . . . . . . . . . .24
(.34)
Intercept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.07
(2.07)
1.78
(2.42)
4.93
(3.31)
1.81
(2.07)
N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 402 353 402 402
LR x2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.200 19.761* 15.136 14.771
df . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 9 9 9
BIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,152.391 1,846.288 2,152.326 2,151.961
Note.—Numbers in parentheses are SEs.
 .P ! .10
* .P ! .05
** .P ! .01
TABLE A5
Results from Discrete-Time Logistic Event History Analyses of Passage
with Alternative Sample Excluding Former Confederacy
(Compare to Model 3, Table 3)
Coeff.
High-bracket taxpayers (% of returns) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .005
(.02)
Voting rights (ln turnout in last presidential election) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.11
(2.00)
Traditional party organization (1–5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .004
(.18)
Republican Party control (0–2 legislative houses) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16
(.25)
Taxpayers’ organizations (per 100,000 people, ca. 1939) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12
(.09)
Share of military spending . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19.38†
(10.61)
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TABLE A5 (Continued)
Coeff.
State constitution limits income tax? (1 p yes) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.44*
(.56)
Public opposed to income tax (%) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12**
(.04)
Adjacent states passing resolutions in previous 2 years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .80**
(.29)
Intercept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.96
(8.42)
N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 312
LR x2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22.695**
df . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
BIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,597.984
Note.—Numbers in parentheses are SEs.
 .P ! .10
* .P ! .05
** .P ! .01
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